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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to synthesize insights from existing research on the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, from an international point of view, and suggest several 
avenues for future research in this area.  
Design/methodology/approach - in conjunction with the analysis of existing research, the 
paper examines how different regulators and accounting standard setters have approached the 
topic of non-GAAP earnings disclosure. 
Findings - The paper shows how non-GAAP earning have been found to be more 
informative than GAAP earnings in several scenarios (countries where non-GAAP disclosures 
are compulsory, countries where these disclosures are voluntary but regulated and countries 
where they are not regulated). However, in certain circumstances, these disclosures may also 
mislead investors. Corporate governance mechanisms can curb managers’ opportunistic use of 
these measures. 
Originality/value - The paper provides the growing number of academic researchers in 
this emerging area with a foundation and agenda upon which they can build their research. 
 
Keywords: non-GAAP earnings, pro forma earnings, alternative performance measures, 
headline earnings. 
Paper type: Research paper  
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1. Introduction 
When managers report their firms’ financial performance they can simply disclose only the 
earnings measures that are required by accounting standards, or they can choose to voluntarily 
disclose additional performance measures, which may not follow generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). I refer to these other measures as “non-GAAP earnings”.1 Most 
of the discussion around non-GAAP measures stems from one single question: do managers 
disclose them to inform capital markets or to mislead stakeholders?  
The good news is that prior research has found that non-GAAP measures provide 
information that is relevant for investors and other stakeholders, beyond that of the GAAP 
earnings number disclosed in financial statements. This has been identified empirically in the 
US (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2003), in Europe (e.g. Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2017), and in other 
countries (e.g. Australia). Prior researchers have also analyzed the persistence of these 
measures. For example, Coulton et al. (2016) find that, in Australia, non-GAAP earnings per 
share are more persistent and predictable than their GAAP counterparts. Finally, Curtis et al. 
(2014) explore cases where firms with transitory gains disclose non-GAAP earnings that are 
lower than GAAP earnings and conclude that the purpose of these disclosures is to inform 
capital markets. Thus, the disclosure of these measures can reduce information asymmetry and 
provide investors with an earnings figure that is useful for forecasting and valuation.  
Nevertheless, and because the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings can alter investors’ 
perceptions of firms’ performance, these disclosures can also be used by managers to attempt 
to mislead investors. Evidence of opportunistic behavior is usually associated with (i) the 
                                                          
1 The adjusted measures created by managers are called by different names around the world. For example, 
in the US, they are generally called “non-GAAP measures”. They are referred to as “alternative performance 
measures” in Europe, “non-IFRS financial information” in Australia, and “headline earnings” in South Africa. 
For the sake of simplicity, and because most of the studies performed on the disclosure of these measures analyze 
US data, I refer to them as “non-GAAP measures”. 
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disclosure of non-GAAP measures which beat earnings’ benchmarks (when GAAP earnings 
measures fall short), (ii) managers making adjustments for items that are recurring, and (iii) the 
attribution of more emphasis to non-GAAP than GAAP earnings (i.e., the strategic  prominence 
of non-GAAP). Evidence of this opportunistic behavior is further discussed subsequently. 
Furthermore, short sellers’ trades suggest that non-GAAP earnings provide them with 
exploitable information advantages (Christensen et al., 2014). Taken together, prior evidence 
seems to indicate that although non-GAAP measures are useful for capital markets, there are 
instances when they can mislead investors (especially less sophisticated users). It is this 
concern that has motivated some regulators to establish rules about the disclosure of non-
GAAP measures.  
The objective of this paper is to provide an international overview of this field of study, 
and suggest possible avenues for future research. I organize the factors associated with non-
GAAP disclosure into (i) country-level factors, (ii) factors related to capital markets, (iii), 
industry-level factors, and (iv) firm-level factors. Next, I include a section on data collection 
and methodology. I conclude by providing my suggestions for future research and some closing 
remarks. Young (2014) and Black et al. (2017a) are useful complementary sources of 
information on non-GAAP disclosures. Young (2014) reviews the academic and professional 
debate surrounding non-GAAP earnings reporting by management in general, while Black et 
al. (2017a) provide an overview of the regulatory backdrop to the non-GAAP disclosure 
environment and summarize the topics with the highest impact in the literature. 
 
2. Country-level considerations: Regulations versus recommendations and 
institutional settings 
There is no uniform standard for the calculation of or disclosure of non-GAAP measures 
across countries. While in some countries, like the US and Australia, these disclosures are 
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voluntary and regulated, South Africa has made these disclosures compulsory. Listed firms in 
Europe, which are monitored by the European Securities and Markets Authority, have to 
consider a set of recommendations for non-GAAP disclosure. I describe the different settings 
and some of the prior evidence subsequently. 
The US was the first country to regulate the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. 
In 2001 the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) issued a cautionary warning. In 2003, 
as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC issued Regulation G. This regulation 
established the conditions required for the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures, and 
required firms disclosing them to provide a reconciliation between these measures and the most 
directly comparable GAAP measure. In the aftermath of Regulation G, firms temporarily 
reduced their disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures (Marques, 2006), but the frequency 
of non-GAAP disclosure soon rebounded. In fact, Black et al. (2017b) document that 71% of 
the S&P500 firms disclose non-GAAP earnings in 2014. Moreover, the mandated 
reconciliation provides valuable information for capital markets (Elliott, 2006; Marques, 2010, 
Zhang and Zheng, 2011) and the quality of non-GAAP disclosures increased after the 
regulation (Kolev et al., 2008; Heflin and Hsu, 2008). Recently, the SEC has issued 
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial 
measures–the most recent one in May of 2016. 
Entwistle et al. (2005) compare the disclosure of non-GAAP measures in the US to similar 
disclosures made in Canada. They find that there are significant differences between the 
reporting practices of the two countries in the year they analyze.2 For example, managers in 
the US are “far more likely to report” non-GAAP earnings, and to give it more emphasis in the 
                                                          
2 Another paper that compares two sets of firms is Epping and Wilder (2011). They compare non-GAAP 
disclosures of US-listed foreign firms with those of US firms and find that US firms disclose non-GAAP measures 
more aggressively. 
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press release. Since the one–year period analyzed (2001 to 2002) was before the introduction 
of Regulation G, it is now an empirical question whether these differences are still present. 
There is no regulation in Europe for the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. However, 
IAS 33 – Earnings per share, implicitly allows for the disclosure of these measures, by stating 
that “if an entity discloses, in addition to basic and diluted earnings per share, amounts per 
share using a reported component of the statement of comprehensive income other than one 
required by this Standard, such amounts shall be calculated using the weighted average number 
of ordinary shares determined in accordance with this Standard”, and that  “if a component of 
the statement of comprehensive income is used that is not reported as a line item in the 
statement of comprehensive income, a reconciliation shall be provided between the component 
used and a line item that is reported in the statement of comprehensive income” (Paragraph 
73).  
In 2002, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) issued a 
cautionary statement which, similarly to the SEC’s 2001 cautionary advice, states that non-
GAAP earnings can be useful for investors “if properly used and presented”, but can also 
mislead investors “if such measures are used in such a way as to obscure the financial results 
determined according to GAAP or provide an incomplete description of true financial results”. 
In 2005 the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the predecessor of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), issued a set of recommendations for the 
disclosure of non-GAAP measures, suggesting that firms which choose to disclose these 
measures do it “in a way that is appropriate and useful for investors’ decision making.” In 2009 
the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) notes that non-GAAP figures 
referred to by the same name are “calculated differently by different companies” and that in 
many cases companies do not provide a reconciliation to GAAP information. In 2015 ESMA 
published its Final Guidelines on Alternative Performance Measures, for listed issuers, with 
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the objective of encouraging “European issuers to publish transparent, unbiased and 
comparable information on their financial performance in order to provide users a 
comprehensive understanding of their performance” (press release, ESMA, 2015). 
Most papers that analyze non-GAAP disclosures in Europe use data from one single 
country. The most studied country is the UK, as Financial Reporting Standard 3 (1993) allows 
(but does not require) firms to disclose additional earnings per share to the one that is required 
by the standard. If non-GAAP measures are disclosed, then firms must present them 
consistently across time, reconcile it to the FRS3 measure and give it as much emphasis as the 
measures calculated according to the standard. This provision of the standard has led to the use 
of UK data from before the introduction of the IFRS (2005). Walker and Louvari (2003) study 
the determinants of the disclosure of non-GAAP measures by quoted companies. Choi et al. 
(2007) examine the adjustments made both by managers and analysts in their construction of 
non-GAAP and street earnings measures, identifying the source and properties of the items 
where there is no agreement.3 Consistent with the general view on non-GAAP disclosures (as 
discussed in the introduction) they find that most of the adjustments made by managers are 
valuable, but there is a subset of management adjustments that are consistent with an attempt 
to mislead investors. This desire to inform capital markets is again discovered in Choi and 
Young (2015). 
In 2003 and 2005 the French market regulator, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF), issued guidelines on non-GAAP disclosures. These guidelines request the disclosure 
of a reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP measures. Aubert (2010) also states that 
                                                          
3 “Street earnings” are non-GAAP measures created by financial analysts. Non-GAAP and Street earnings 
were initially seen as one earnings’ category, and sometimes jointly referred to as pro forma earnings (e.g.: 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Most studies now distinguish them and do not use analysts’ figures as a proxy for the 
non-GAAP measures that managers disclose.  
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“the AMF asserted that this situation stemmed from the 2005 switch to IFRS, which is not well 
standardized in terms of performance results presentation.” Using data from 1996 to 2006, 
collected from 116 press releases, Aubert (2010) documents that the most commonly reported 
non-GAAP measure is “net profit before goodwill amortization”.  
In Germany, the Securities Act generally prohibits the disclosure of misleading 
information but does not specifically refer to non-GAAP measures. Hitz (2010) investigates 
the disclosure of non-GAAP measures in the press releases of large listed firms of 2005 and 
2006. He classifies non-GAAP disclosures into two groups, separating the measures that are 
reconcilable to net income from those which are reconcilable to operating income (which he 
calls EB – Earnings Before – measures), and documents that both sets of non-GAAP measures 
are amply reported. 
 In 2012 the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) published 
“Alternative performance measures – A survey of their use together with key 
recommendations”.  In this document IAASA encourages issuers to (i) clearly define each non-
GAAP measure disclosed, (ii) explain why they are disclosed and how they are calculated, (iii) 
disclose all non-GAAP measures in a single location, and (iv) avoid giving it undue emphasis, 
among other things. In 2015 IAASA published an update to the previous document, based on 
the 2013 annual financial statements of a selected group of firms. This review found that the 
disclosure of non-GAAP measures was “universal”, and that differing definitions of apparently 
similar non-GAAP measures are used by different issuers. 
Recent research in European non-GAAP disclosures focuses on the largest firms of Europe, 
using a continuously increasing set of hand-collected data. Isidro and Marques (2013) report 
international evidence on the impact of compensation and board quality on the voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings numbers, using data from 2003 to 2005. Isidro and Marques 
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(2015) assess the role of institutional and economic factors in the strategic use of non-GAAP 
disclosures to beat several earnings benchmarks, using data from 2003 to 2007. Their results 
indicate that there is a greater likelihood of disclosure of non-GAAP numbers that meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks, when the GAAP number misses the target, in countries with efficient 
laws and law enforcement, strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and good 
communication and dissemination of information. Thus, in countries where there is more 
pressure to meet short-term earnings targets and earnings management is more difficult, the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings to meet earnings benchmarks is more frequent. Guillamon-
Saorin et al. (2017) use two sets of data hand-collected from the press releases of the largest 
European firms, from 2003 to 2009: (i) the non-GAAP disclosures made, and (ii) the 
impression management techniques used in the sections where these disclosures were made. 
Their results indicate that there is a market reaction to both the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings and the use of high impression management. However, the combination of the two 
practices is not associated with a market reaction, suggesting that investors interpret it as a 
possible managerial attempt to mask the persistence of the non-GAAP adjustments. In fact, in 
countries with more sophisticated market participants and stronger investor protection, the 
market reaction to the combination of non-GAAP disclosures with high impression 
management is statistically negative. This result suggests that in more sophisticated markets 
firms can be penalized for their disclosure choices.  
In Australia, non-GAAP disclosures are regulated. In December 2011 the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission issued Regulatory Guide 230 – Disclosing non-IFRS 
financial information. The major requirements of this regulation are the prominence given to 
non-GAAP earnings, the terminology used by firms, the disclosure of a detailed reconciliation 
between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings and the consistency, across time, of the adjustments 
made by managers. One also needs to consider that AASB 133 – Earnings per share (issued in 
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2004) allows the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, in a similar way as described previously 
for IAS 33. 
Cameron et al. (2012) observe that the non-GAAP disclosures of Australian firms, from 
2007 to 2009, vary considerably, both in the way they were calculated and in the extent to 
which a reconciliation was provided. This result is consistent with evidence from EFRAG in 
Europe, and brought concerns to security regulators. Malone et al. (2016) analyze disclosures 
from 2008 to 2010, investigating non-GAAP earnings adjustments for fair value re-
measurements made by companies and analysts, as well as the usefulness of these disclosures 
for analysts. The only document that exists on Australian non-GAAP disclosures after the 2011 
regulation is the report by Coulton et al. (2016).  Since this is not a research paper and it 
provides only descriptive evidence, I look forward to future studies, where the introduction of 
this regulation is analyzed. 
As mentioned previously, South Africa is a special case, when it comes to reporting non-
GAAP measures, because beginning in October of 2000, firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange are required to disclose in their financial statements their “headline 
earnings” per share, in addition to the earnings per share measures required by IAS 33. These 
non-GAAP measures exclude many non-recurring items, and thus firms disaggregate their 
earnings into different components. Firms are also required to include, in their financial 
statements, a reconciliation between non-GAAP and IFRS earnings, which is subject to audit. 
As headline earnings are calculated according to a specified decomposition, they are (i) less 
affected by managers’ discretion and earnings management, and (ii) comparable across firms. 
Analyzing data from 2001 to 2008 Venter et al. (2013) first assess the persistence of headline 
earnings adjustments, accruals, and cash flows (splitting the last two categories into the part 
that is included and the part that is excluded from headline earnings). Next, they analyze 
whether these persistence levels are reflected in price, and conclude that investors price 
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earnings components “in a manner that is consistent with the actual levels of persistence of 
these components.” In a second study, Venter et al. (2014) find that these mandated non-GAAP 
earnings are more informative than the GAAP earnings, and that headline earnings adjustments 
are value irrelevant, using data from 2002 to 2009.  
In New Zealand, the Financial Markets Authority (FMA), responding to concerns that non-
GAAP disclosures could mislead investors, introduced guidelines, to improve firms’ practices, 
in 2012. There are two studies on non-GAAP disclosures in New Zealand. However, both 
analyze a period before the introduction of the new guidelines. Rainsbury et al. (2012) examine 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in the annual reports of New Zealand listed companies 
from 2004 to 2012, and find evidence that the disclosure of these measures can be made to 
inform investors, as well as to influence their perception of performance. Xu et al. (2016) 
analyze annual reports from 2006 to 2010, and find that non-GAAP disclosures are positively 
associated with share liquidity. 
 
3. Capital markets considerations 
The fact that investors and financial analysts react to non-GAAP information creates 
incentives for managers to use non-GAAP reporting when they want to influence the market’s 
perception about performance achievements. This association has led to the disclosure of non-
GAAP measures which meet/beat earnings benchmarks, that GAAP earnings do not meet, to 
be seen as an indication of managers’ opportunistic motives (e.g.: Walker and Louvari, 2003). 
This characterization is especially true if the adjustments made by the firms are for recurring 
items. Black and Christensen (2009) report that three of the most frequent adjustments in their 
sample are recurring items: research and development expenses, depreciation and amortization, 
and share-based compensation. Barth et al. (2012) also analyze the adjustments made for share-
based compensation expenses, finding that these adjustments do not predict future GAAP 
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earnings. They suggest the adjustment for share-based compensation expenses are used by 
managers not only to beat benchmarks but also to smooth earnings. Moreover, Barth et al. 
(2012) analyze street earnings and conclude that the adjustments made by financial analysts 
are associated with an increase in the predictive ability of these measures. Thus, managers and 
analysts, on average, have different incentives for adjusting GAAP earnings. 
As mentioned previously, the practice of giving more emphasis to non-GAAP 
disclosures than to GAAP figures is also seen as a red flag for potentially misleading intentions. 
This classification is because the presentation of the non-GAAP measure before the GAAP one 
may alter investors’ perception of the firms’ results, and hamper a comparison of the two 
measures. Thus, several regulations/recommendations require/ask firms to give equal emphasis 
to the two sets of measures. Elliott (2006) is an example of a paper that analyzes the impact of 
non-GAAP emphasis. She finds that the influence of emphasis is mitigated by the disclosure 
of a reconciliation. 
Another factor, related to capital markets, that is associated with non-GAAP 
disclosures, is investors’ sentiment. Brown et al. (2012) argue that during optimistic periods, 
investors will evaluate managers’ pro forma disclosures less rigorously and that this reduced 
investor scrutiny will result in lower disclosure-related costs. Their results indicate that as the 
level of investor sentiment increases so does (i) the propensity to disclose a non-GAAP 
measure, (ii) the propensity to disclose a measure that his higher than GAAP earnings, (iii) the 
value of the adjustments made by managers (both total and for recurring items), and (iv) the 
emphasis given to the non-GAAP earnings measure in the press release. All these indicators 
suggest that managers, in optimistic periods, use non-GAAP disclosures with misleading 
intentions. 
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4. Industry-level considerations 
Most studies on non-GAAP earnings analyze all industries present in their sample, 
simply describing which ones represent a larger portion of the non-GAAP measures identified, 
without giving details about industry-specific effects. Zhang and Zheng (2011), for example, 
find that high-tech firms represent almost 60% of the observations where a non-GAAP earnings 
figure is disclosed, while Coulton et al. (2016) report that Australian companies in the utilities 
industry are the most likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Black et al. (2017a), while 
analyzing the disclosures of the S&P500 firms in the US, find one factor that is peculiar about 
firms in the financial sector: they are the ones which make the smallest number of adjustments, 
when calculating non-GAAP measures. In fact, on average these firms make two adjustments, 
while the sector of health care, for example, has an average of almost 4 adjustments. 
A few papers focus on the disclosures of a specific industry. The real estate investment 
funds (REIT) industry is studied by Baik et al. (2008). However, this paper is focused on the 
disclosure of a non-GAAP measure that does not portray earnings: funds from operations. Sek 
and Taylor (2011) provide a case study on the non-GAAP disclosures of the four largest 
Australian banks, from 2003 to 2008. They find evidence that the banks disclose “cash 
earnings” (the most popular term, also used for ratios’ calculation), as well as “underlying 
earnings”, but not in a consistent manner. Moreover, the introduction of IFRS is associated 
with an increase in the number of adjustments made, as well as with a change in the type of 
adjustments made. The “new” adjustments found are changes in the fair value of hedges and 
changes in the value of treasury shares. 
 
5. Firm-level considerations 
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Some prior research on non-GAAP earnings analyzes the determinants of the decision to 
disclose such measures. Lougee and Marquadt (2004), for example, consider firms’ sales 
growth and book to market ratio (to measure the growth of the firm), the debt to equity ratio 
(to measure leverage), the standard deviation of return on assets (to measure earnings 
variability), the existence of special items, size and intangible intensity. These determinants 
have later been used in other studies, either in models used to test how the probability of non-
GAAP disclosure is affected by an event (like the introduction of Regulation G), or in the first 
step of selection models (e.g.: Marques, 2006). Recently, researchers have found that firms can 
also change their non-GAAP reporting practices in response to debt covenant violations. 
Christensen et al. (2017) find that after a debt covenant violation there is a significant decrease 
in (i) the probability of a firm disclosing non-GAAP earnings, and (ii) the predictive value of 
the adjustments made.  
Corporate governance mechanisms can deter managers’ opportunistic behavior. This 
“gate-keeper” task is especially important in the case of non-GAAP disclosures, because this 
information is not subject to audit (except in South Africa, as mentioned). While there is only 
one paper on this topic that uses European data (Isidro and Marques, 2013), there are three 
papers analyzing the relation of corporate governance and non-GAAP disclosures that analyze 
data from the US. Isidro and Marques (2013) study how compensation and board quality affect 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings of the largest European firms. They find that 
compensation contracts of board directors that are linked to firm's market performance are 
associated with more non-GAAP disclosures and with several reporting practices that are seen 
as opportunistic: (i) reporting non-GAAP figures in the title of the press release, (ii) making 
more adjustments for recurring items, and (iii) not including a reconciliation in the press 
release. However, when the board quality score of the firm is higher, firms disclose non-GAAP 
earnings less frequently and give them less emphasis. 
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Using US data, Jennings and Marques (2011) analyze how the introduction of 
Regulation G, as well as corporate governance, affect non-GAAP disclosures. They consider 
two corporate governance variables: (i) percent of independent directors present in the board 
of directors, and (ii) percent of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Their results 
indicate that there is a substitution effect between regulation and corporate governance 
mechanisms, as before Regulation G investors were misled by the adjustments made by firms 
with weak corporate governance, but after the regulation was issued this effect is no longer 
present. To provide more direct evidence of private benefits to management Frankel et al. 
(2011) examine insider selling following earnings announcements where non-GAAP 
adjustments are associated with meeting analysts’ consensus, as well as board independence.  
They find that managers seem to use non-GAAP disclosures to appear to meet analysts’ 
consensus prior to selling their shares more often in firms with fewer independent board 
members. Finally, Christensen et al. (2017) explore three monitoring mechanisms when 
studying the impact of debt covenant violations in non-GAAP disclosures: (i) blockholder 
ownership, (ii) proportion of independent audit committee members, and (iii) audit quality. 
They find all three mechanisms are positively associated with an improvement in non-GAAP 
disclosure quality. 
Some papers analyze the association of remuneration practices to non-GAAP disclosures. 
The main idea is that certain remuneration practices may motivate a strategic (and potentially 
misleading) disclosure of these measures. Isidro and Marques (2013) has been discussed 
previously. Grey et al. (2013) study whether the existence of performance targets in executives’ 
remuneration packages is associated with non-GAAP disclosures of the largest listed firms in 
the UK (in 2002 and 2003), since both EPS targets and non-GAAP figures “typically focus on 
permanent earnings excluding transitory items”. Their results indicate that this association is 
present when the vesting of executive stock options is contingent on the achievement of growth 
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in EPS – an economically relevant result if one considers that, in this sample, the majority of 
executive stock options have 3-year EPS growth targets which have to be met before any 
options vest.  
Three studies analyze how factors related to compensation are associated with non-GAAP 
disclosures in the US. Black et al. (2016) posit that compensation contracts can change 
managers’ non-GAAP disclosures by leading them to focus on the long-term performance of 
the firm. Their evidence indicates that long-term plan incentives are negatively associated with 
the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Moreover, data collected 
from proxy statements indicate that if the compensation contracts explicitly state that managers 
are evaluated based on non-GAAP earnings there is less aggressive non-GAAP reporting, while 
discretion of this matter is associated with more aggressive non-GAAP reporting.4 However, 
when controlling for board quality (as in Isidro and Marques, 2013) the impact of long-term 
payout is no longer significant. The same focus on the long-term is present in Curtis et al. 
(2015). They find that the majority of S&P firms use adjusted earnings for performance 
evaluation, but CEO tenure is negatively associated with the use of non-GAAP earnings for 
this purpose. Their additional evidence points towards efficient contracting. Finally, Kyung et 
al. (2016) study how clawback provisions, which allow firms to recover compensation based 
on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, is associated with non-GAAP 
disclosures. Using two alternative measures of aggressive non-GAAP reporting (predictive 
power of adjustments for future operating income and the one used in Black et al, 2016) they 
find an increase in aggressiveness after the clawback provisions are adopted. They interpret 
this as evidence that an increase in the cost of manipulating GAAP earnings can cause 
                                                          
4 Aggressive reporting of non-GAAP earnings is measured in Black et al. (20116) by an indicator variable, coded 
as one when the adjustments made by managers are higher than the adjustments made by analysts, and zero 
otherwise. 
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opportunistic managers to change their focus to non-GAAP disclosures – which is consistent 
with the results of Isidro and Marques (2015).   
 
6. Research design considerations 
a. Data collection 
The terms managers use, when referring to non-GAAP measures, vary greatly. These 
include recurring earnings, adjusted earnings, core earnings, normalized earnings, underlying 
earnings, etc. The fact that different firms, across different time periods, use different terms 
makes machine-reading of texts more inefficient than hand collection when looking for non-
GAAP disclosures. However, hand-collection of data often leads to small samples, as the 
process is time-consuming. For example, Cameron et al. (2012) studies only 50 firms. 
Moreover, on the face of the need to collect information about a small number of firms, 
researchers tend to focus on the largest firms of the country/area they are analyzing. Although 
these firms are economically relevant, it is possible that researchers are missing pertinent 
information about the disclosure of non-GAAP measures in medium and small firms. 
Researchers and regulators have also expressed conflicting views on whether or not EBIT 
and EBITDA, as well as adjusted versions of these measures, should be considered non-GAAP 
measures.5 For example, while Bowen et al. (2005) mentions in their footnote 9 that only 
adjusted EBIT and EBITDA measures were considered non-GAAP measures, Marques (2006) 
collects and analyzes both the adjusted and unadjusted version of these measures, since they 
are not defined in accounting standards and Reg. G states that EBITDA, can be “calculated 
using elements derived from GAAP financial presentations but, in any event, is not presented 
                                                          
5 EBIT stands for Earnings Before Interests and Taxes, while EBITDA stands for Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization.  
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in accordance with GAAP”.  A recent press release from ESMA (2015) considers that all these 
measures are non-GAAP, as it states that “examples of APMs most commonly used include 
EBIT (Earnings Before Interest & Tax), EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortisation), free cash flow, and underlying profit or net-debt.” 
While most studies analyze the disclosures made in earnings announcement press releases, 
some papers analyze the text of annual reports (e.g.: Cameron et al, 2012). Moreover, there are 
two studies on Australian data that collect information from several sources.6 Malone et al. 
(2016) collect data from annual reports, earnings announcements and investor presentations 
logged with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). They find that from 2008 to 2010 the 
majority of firms presented the same non-GAAP earnings measure across all media, and that 
the annual report was the source with a highest percentage of non-GAAP disclosures (89%). 
Coulton et al. (2016) collect non-GAAP data from firms’ media releases, preliminary financial 
statements and annual reports, from 2000 to 2014. They find that “media releases and others 
are found to be the most prevalent medium of initial non-GAAP disclosure, followed by the 
preliminary financial statements” and interpret this as evidence that firms want to place early 
focus on non-GAAP earnings. This difference in the main media to disclose non-GAAP 
earnings in Australia may be due to: (i) different sample, as Malone et al. (2016) study the ASX 
200, while Coulton et al. (2016) study the ASX 500, (ii) the fact Malone et al. (2016) have a 
longer time period, or (iii) the introduction of regulation, as Malone et al. (2016) do not cover 
data disclosed after the issuance of Regulatory Guide 230.  
A final consideration in data collection is that per share non-GAAP measures that may use 
a number of outstanding shares that is different from the one used in the calculation of GAAP 
                                                          
6 One needs to consider that IAS 33 only applies to the non-GAAP figures disclosed in the financial statements. 
Thus, the measures disclosed in the financial statements may not be directly comparable to the ones discussed 
in other documents (e.g.: press releases). 
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EPS, as this would reduce the comparability of the measures. If the denominator used in the 
calculation of non-GAAP EPS by managers is different from the one used in the calculation of 
GAAP EPS researchers could make adjustments to increase comparability or flag these 
observations for further analysis. In fact, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) document that analysts 
appear skeptical of measures where “managers manipulate the number of shares used in the 
EPS calculation”. Moreover, when researchers collect aggregated measures (as adjusted net 
income) and need to calculate an equivalent per share measure they should use the number of 
outstanding shares used in the calculation of GAAP EPS. 
 
b. Methodological considerations 
While most of the studies on non-GAAP disclosure are empirical archival, there are a few 
experimental papers. These studies have high internal validity, as the researchers can control 
for the influence of external factors on the results, reducing the impact of systematic error. 
Moreover, if both archival and experimental studies’ findings are consistent, researchers 
recognize these findings are robust. Next, I present the findings of four experimental studies 
on non-GAAP disclosures: the initial two were performed in the US, but the latter ones were 
performed in Sweden and Australia.  
Frederickson and Miller (2004) find that less sophisticated investors’ judgements are 
affected by the disclosure of a non-GAAP measure which is higher than the GAAP figure, 
while there is no impact in the calculations of analysts. Elliott (2006) expands on this evidence 
by considering both the emphasis given to the non-GAAP measures and manipulating whether 
or not a reconciliation is provided to explain the non-GAAP measures. Her results indicate that 
analysts react to these two treatments differently than non-sophisticated investors. While non-
sophisticated investors react to the emphasis given to the non-GAAP disclosure (a reaction that 
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is reduced in the presence of a reconciliation), analysts interpret the presence of a reconciliation 
as a sign of non-GAAP reliability. Allee et al. (2007) directly tests both Frederickson and Miller 
(2004)’s and Elliott (2006)’s experimental evidence using archival data. 
In an experiment with Swedish financial analysts Andersson and Hellman (2007) test their 
reactions to a setting where the non-GAAP measure is a profit, while the GAAP earnings figure 
is a loss. They find that the presence of such a non-GAAP measure is associated with higher 
forecasts of EPS. Thus, analysts can also be affected by these voluntary disclosures.  Johnson 
et al. (2014) perform an experiment in Australia where, like in Andersson and Hellman (2007), 
non-GAAP is positive, while the GAAP earnings are negative. They find that if non-GAAP 
earnings are disclosed in the narrative section of the annual report non-sophisticated investors, 
when asked to identify profitability measures, select this information.  
Some of the initial empirical archival studies have found that non-GAAP earnings were 
more informative than GAAP earnings analyzing earnings surprises. The two sets of earnings 
surprises (GAAP and non-GAAP) were calculated considering, as the expected value for both 
non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings, analysts’ consensus (e.g. Marques, 2016). This was 
due to the lack of other forecasts. However, analysts’ forecasts are not of GAAP earnings, but 
of street earnings, which are not calculated according to GAAP. Thus, the fact that there was 
only one set of earnings forecasts available introduced a measurement error in the analyses. 
This problem is discussed in detail in Cohen et al. (2007). Since I/B/E/S now provides both 
GAAP forecasts as well as non-GAAP forecasts, these two measures can be used to calculate 
the GAAP surprise and non-GAAP surprise, respectively. Bradshaw et al. (2016) use these two 
sets of forecasts to re-assess whether non-GAAP earnings are more informative than GAAP 
earnings, after correcting for the measurement error. Their conclusions validate previous 
studies, as non-GAAP earnings remian more informative to investors than GAAP earnings.  
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7. Suggestions for future research 
Although there are several papers published on the topic of non-GAAP earnings, this 
is a field that can produce information of interest not only for investors, but also for standard 
setters and regulators. Thus, there is scope for several future studies on non-GAAP earnings 
disclosure. Some ideas that can be developed in the future are discussed next.  
 
a. Country-level characteristics and across-countries studies 
Black et al. (2017a) finish their paper by stating that there is significant room for 
additional evidence from other (than the US) settings around the world. I agree with this 
statement. However, future research should avoid pure replications of prior evidence (for 
example, showing that some effect documented in the US is also present in another 
country), and strive to analyze characteristics that are unique to the countries studied. A 
good example of this is Venter et al. (2013, 2014), which takes advantage of the fact that 
South African non-GAAP disclosures are compulsory. These result could be extended by 
analyzing how the mandatory non-GAAP measures differ from other non-GAAP measures, 
which managers disclose voluntarily. Understanding which firms engage in voluntary 
disclosure of additional non-GAAP measures (and their reasons) could provide insights 
valuable to regulators. Another example of a potentially interesting open question based on 
a country’s characteristic is whether IAASA’s recommendation to disclose all non-GAAP 
measures in a single location has any impact on how these measures are processed by 
investors of Irish firms. 
Australia, on the other hand, seems to be the ideal setting to study the impact of changes 
in IFRS on the disclosure of non-GAAP measures, as the country totally converted to 
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standards that are equivalent to the international standards in 2005 (unlike in Europe, where 
only listed firms did). This provides researchers with a large sample, including firms of 
different sizes. However, researchers need to consider the pre-existing differences between 
local GAAP and IFRS. While the financial press suggested that IFRS adds additional 
complexity to financial information, which may increase rather than reduce non-GAAP 
disclosures (e.g.: Bruce, 2007), Isidro and Marques (2015) find that the European firms 
reporting under IFRS disclose less non-GAAP information. This evidence is consistent 
with IFRS leading to an improvement in the reporting quality of GAAP information, as 
suggested by Barth et al. (2008). Thus, while Malone et al. (2016) investigate the setting of 
IFRS adoption in Australia, focusing on fair value, future studies could study the time of 
changes in standards, and how those changes relate to non-GAAP earnings disclosures, as 
this could be of interest to standard setters. Complementary, researchers will be able to 
assess the impact of the introduction of the 2011 regulation on non-GAAP disclosures. 
Moreover, researchers can analyze how country-level characteristics affect already 
documented associations. Isidro and Marques (2015) analyze the impact of some 
institutional and economic factors, across several European countries, on the use of non-
GAAP measures to beat earnings benchmarks. A future study could, for example, assess 
the impact of cultural characteristics, as the six identified in Hofstede (2001), or the scores 
identified by Project Globe (House et al., 2004). 
Finally, new research should be done in order to assess what impact ESMA’s new set 
of recommendations has had on the disclosure of non-GAAP performance measures by 
listed European firms. This new research should not focus exclusively on non-GAAP 
measures that are comparable to net income, as most papers have done so far, but also 
consider earnings measures that are closer to operating income. This is because ESMA’s 
press release (2015) states that “examples of APMs most commonly used include EBIT 
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(Earnings Before Interest & Tax), EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortisation), free cash flow, and underlying profit or net-debt.” 
 
b. Textual analysis 
Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2017) manually collect the non-GAAP earnings measures 
disclosed and code the use of impression management techniques that surround these 
measures, for a sample of 845 observations. They also analyze, with machine coding, how 
the tone of the sentences related to non-GAAP is associated with markets’ reaction to 
earnings announcement. More work should be done on the way managers report non-
GAAP measures, so that investors are aware how different reporting practices of these 
measures can affect their decisions and market outcomes. Machine coding can be used in 
order to analyze the texts or, at a minimum, to identify a large sample of observations with 
non-GAAP that later need to be coded by hand. Bentley et al. (2016) and Coulton et al. 
(2016) have initiated this trend, by using machine coding to find the measures, and future 
research could further it by using machines to collect more information. The textual 
analysis could reveal, for example, (i) whether the readability level of press releases with 
non-GAAP disclosures is similar to those where only GAAP measures are included, (ii) if 
the sections where non-GAAP measures are disclosed are different from the remaining 
sections of the text, (iii) what are the topics that are usually disclosed before and after non-
GAAP disclosures, in order to explore whether there is a firm-specific structure in the press 
release.  
Textual analysis can also be used to determine the main media for the disclosure of 
non-GAAP disclosures, since the evidence using Australian data are not consistent (Malone 
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et al., 2016; Coulton et al., 2016). Furthermore, it would be interesting to know whether 
the main media used changes across countries, geographical areas, and regulatory systems. 
 
c. Corporate governance 
In a recent roundtable on “A governance research agenda for the academy” at Columbia 
Law School (Bucsescu, 2017) it was argued that a major corporate governance challenge 
is the “inadequate shareholder commitment to long-term cooperation”, and that two 
commitment devices are staggered boards and supermajority voting. These mechanisms, 
analyzed in Cremers and Sepe (2016) and Cremers et al. (2016), should help ensure that 
managers feel more confident taking long-term value-maximizing decisions. Future 
research could investigate whether the firms that have these mechanisms in place disclose 
both non-GAAP earnings and non-GAAP forecasts, as a way to inform investors of their 
long-term plans. 
Swanson and Young (2017) investigate how three types of highly informed market 
participants (financial analysts, short sellers and institutional investors) respond to activist 
interventions. They find that financial analysts and short sellers respond to the purchase of 
shares by activists “as if the increase in stock price at the activist intervention represents 
real value creation”. Moreover, the ownership by dedicated (long-term) institutional 
investors increases following an activist intervention. Thus, all three types of informed 
market participants react positively to activists. Swanson and Young (2017) also provide 
evidence that an index of financial statement fundamentals improves after activists’ 
interventions. It would be interesting to analyze whether disclosures (in general, and also 
considering non-GAAP earnings) also improve after these interventions and whether the 
effect of disclosure mediates the main results of the paper. 
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Another point which could be interesting to analyze is how the characteristics of the 
several parties involved in providing information to capital markets shape the non-GAAP 
disclosures made. It is not clear which party is more responsible for the style and content 
of press releases and annual reports. Are they mostly shaped by the investors’ relations 
departments? The chief executive officer? Or the chief financial officer? A future study 
could assess how the characteristics (risk avoidance, overconfidence, education, etc.) of 
these three parties are associated with the quality of the non-GAAP earnings disclosed. 
 
d. SEC’s interpretation 
Elliott (2006) finds that the influence of emphasis given to non-GAAP measures is 
mitigated by the disclosure of a side-by-side reconciliation, and Marques (2010) finds that 
the information content of these reconciliations is higher than that of the other ways of 
explaining the difference between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. However, the May 
2016 SEC interpretation, on paragraph 102.10, states that “presenting a full non-GAAP 
income statement when reconciling non-GAAP measures to the most directly comparable 
GAAP measures” is considered by the staff as a practice that gives more prominence to 
non-GAAP than GAAP earnings. Thus, future research could further investigate if recently 
capital markets concur with this view, and whether the disclosure of this type of 
reconciliation disappears after 2016. A related issue that may reveal interesting insights for 
standard setters is the study of firms that discontinued the disclosure of non-GAAP 
measures. 
 In paragraph 103.02 of the same SEC interpretation it is stated that “If a company 
presents EBIT or EBITDA as a performance measure, such measures should be reconciled 
to net income”, and not to operating income. It is also stated that “these measures must not 
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be presented on a per share basis”. Since there is evidence of ample disclosure of these 
measures, it is an empirical question what the impact of this paragraph will be. 
 
e. Others 
It would be worthwhile investigating whether firms, or CEOs, have a specific disclosure 
pattern or quality. If such firm-level standards of disclosure exist then informative non-
GAAP disclosures should be made by firms which also provide capital markets with other 
useful information voluntarily. This is especially important at a time when there are calls 
for integrating corporate reporting, like the one made by the Federation of European 
Accountants (2015). 
Finally, and since there is little research done on industry-based effects, I suggest that 
future studies consider whether there are certain industry-level regulations,  practices, or 
characteristics that may affect the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. For example, consider 
that the mining industry is excluded from major standards such as inventories, intangible 
assets and property, plant and equipment. Is this exclusion associated with more or less 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings? 
 
8. Conclusion 
The study of non-GAAP earnings disclosures has been growing steadily. Descriptive 
evidence indicate that the disclosure of these measures is a current practice in several 
countries, and that it has been increasing. Regulators and standard setters have considered 
them in their deliberations and continue to discuss them, given their role in financial 
reporting (Gordon et al., 2015). All of this makes this area an exciting one to work on. This 
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paper provides an international overview of the main findings in the area and leaves 
suggestions for questions that remain to be explored. Other questions will emerge as further 
research is undertaken. All these are opportunities for academics to provide unbiased and 
rigorous analyses, which can help develop the functioning of capital markets. 
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